Flooding remains a major problem for the United States, causing numerous deaths and damaging countless properties. To reduce the impact of flooding on communities, the U.S. government established the Community Rating System (CRS) in 1990 to reduce flood damages by incentivizing communities to engage in flood risk management initiatives that surpass those required by the National Flood Insurance Program. In return, communities enjoy discounted flood insurance premiums. Despite the fact that the CRS raises concerns about the potential for unevenly distributed impacts across different income groups, no study has examined the equity implications of the CRS. This study thus investigates the possibility of unintended consequences of the CRS by answering the question: What is the effect of the CRS on poverty and income inequality? Understanding the impacts of the CRS on poverty and income inequality is useful in fully assessing the unintended consequences of the CRS. The study estimates four fixed-effects regression models using a panel dataset of neighborhood-level observations from 1970 to 2010. The results indicate that median incomes are lower in CRS communities, but rise in floodplains. Also, the CRS attracts poor residents, but relocates them away from floodplains. Additionally, the CRS attracts top earners, including in floodplains. Finally, the CRS encourages income inequality, but discourages income inequality in floodplains. A better understanding of these unintended consequences of the CRS on poverty and income inequality can help to improve the design and performance of the CRS, and ultimately, increase community resilience to flood disasters.
INTRODUCTION
Flooding has and continues to be a major problem for the United States, causing numerous deaths and damaging countless properties. (1, 2) According to the National Weather Service, (3) enjoy discounted flood insurance premiums. (4) There are 19 creditable CRS activities such as floodplain management and planning that focus on helping communities to manage their flood risks. Through this activity, a community might develop ordinances that prevent the construction of buildings in floodplains. In so doing, the community is able to reduce its flood risk and floodrelated damages.
Despite the recent increase in policy priority for equity engendered by a persistent increase in income inequality, (5) policy analyses, including those examining the CRS, a flood risk management program (e.g., Brody et al. (6) ; Fan and Davlasheridze (7) ; Sadiq and Noonan (2, 8) ), often overlook the equity implications of the program. Moreover, for policies aiming at protecting vulnerable populations (e.g., by reducing risk exposure) and improving infrastructure, apprehensions about the distributional impacts are paramount. (9) Indeed, the establishment of the CRS raises concerns about the potential for unevenly distributed impacts across different income groups in communities-leading to equity concerns (e.g., the scoring and allocation of discounted flood insurance premiums). (10, 11) Understanding the equity implications of risk management programs such as the CRS are important because minorities, and poor and rich people analyze risk differently. (12, 13) Without considering such differences in risk analysis, wellmeaning risk management programs may not achieve their programmatic goals, and may even lead to unintended consequences that might exacerbate poverty and inequality. In short, if we care about keeping inequality low and reducing poverty, it is important to understand the equity implications of risk management programs such as the CRS.
This study thus investigates the possibility of unintended consequences such as concerns over the fairness of the CRS by answering the following research question: What is the effect of the CRS on local poverty and income inequality? One mechanism through which the CRS could lead to inequities is by reallocating local migration of households at the bottom, middle, and the top of the income distribution. Moreover, discounted flood insurance premiums and building regulations likely have differential effects across the income distribution. Hence, we test whether participation in the CRS program will have implications for community-level poverty and income inequality. Our analysis also examines the impacts of high-risk areas and floodplains within CRS communities on poverty and income inequality.
This study argues that in order to improve the effectiveness of the CRS, especially its flood risk management component, there needs to be an evaluation of the unanticipated consequences of the CRS. By understanding such unexpected consequences such as on poverty and income inequality, the overall performance of the CRS, and in particular, its flood risk management component could be improved. In addition, this study would help the risk analysis community to better understand the relationship between risk and poverty as well as the role of risk analysis in addressing poverty. (14, 15) Finally, our study addresses the deficit in equitycentered empirical research such as the environmental justice literature, where correlations are typically identified rather than policy impacts. (16, 17) To explore the relationship between poverty and income inequality and the CRS, we estimate panel regression models for a national dataset of neighborhood-level observations from 1970 to 2010. The results provide important information on the impacts of the CRS on poverty and income inequality; information that academics, policymakers, CRS evaluators, and other stakeholders can utilize to develop a holistic understanding of the overall impacts of the CRS on participating local communities. In the following sections, we provide background information on the CRS and review relevant literature. Then, our methodology is outlined, including the data and variables. Next, the results are presented and discussed. Finally, the paper concludes by offering suggestions for future research opportunities on the impacts of the CRS on communitylevel outcomes.
BACKGROUND ON THE CRS
To reduce the impact of flooding on communities, the United States government established the NFIP in 1968. The purpose of the NFIP-both then and now-is to reduce the impact of flooding on public and private infrastructures, provide affordable insurance to property owners, and promote the development of flood protection activities in communities throughout the United States. (19) The NFIP is a voluntary initiative between federal and state governments, private insurance companies, and local communities with a mission of reducing flood disasters by enacting and enforcing floodplain management activities in flood-prone areas. (19) Despite the creation of the NFIP, flooding still poses a major risk to communities. As a result, FEMA implemented the CRS in 1990 as a voluntary program designed to incentivize communities to surpass the expectations of the NFIP. The three goals of the CRS are to reduce flood damage to insurable property, strengthen and support the insurance aspects of the NFIP, and foster comprehensive floodplain management. (18) When communities develop flood management activities that reflect these three goals, they enjoy discounted flood insurance premiums commensurate with their CRS class, which ranges from Class 10 to Class 1. (4, 18) Class 10 represents communities that do not participate or do not possess the minimum number of credit points to enter the program. As such, they receive no discount on flood insurance premiums.
Class 1 represents communities with exceptional floodplain management activities who enjoy a 45% discount on flood insurance premiums as long as they are located in a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) (see Table I ). SFHA refers to a land area with a 1% or greater chance of flooding within any given year. Communities located outside of a SFHA only receive a discount of up to 10%. These rankings are based on the number of credit points a community has earned that range from 0-500-a Class 10 community-to 4,500(+)-a Class 1 community. ,999  40  10  3  3,500-3,999  35  10  4  3,000-3,499  30  10  5  2,500-2,999  25  10  6  2,000-2,499  20  10  7  1,500-1,999  15  5  8  1,000-1,499  10  5  9  500-999  5  5  10 0-499 0 0 Source: FEMA (18) . 6 Credit points are given to communities as they implement any of the 19 creditable activities that advance the CRS's goals and span across one of the four categories: public information, mapping and regulations, flood damage reduction, and warning and response (see Table II ). (18) Activities that promote public information include advising individuals about flood hazards and encouraging property owners to purchase flood insurance. Mapping and regulation activities center on preserving open spaces, protecting natural floodplain measures, enforcing standards, and managing stormwater. Credit points are also awarded to communities that endorse flood damage reduction activities such as creating a comprehensive floodplain management plan, relocating or retrofitting structures, and maintaining drainage systems, which help prevent repetitive losses. (20) Lastly, communities receive points for implementing measures that protect life and property in the event of a flood disaster through warning and response programs. The amount of credit points given to communities varies by the mitigation activity in each category. (10) Although the CRS attempts to identify a comprehensive list of credited activities, it recognizes that communities might engage in alternative approaches. These instances are reviewed on a case-by-case basis by an Insurance Services Office (ISO) specialist who also administers the day-to-day operations of the CRS program on behalf of FEMA, and assists communities in the CRS application process. (18) .
Participating in the CRS program is at no cost to communities, and communities can stop participating at any time. However, if communities decide to participate in the CRS program, they must recertify every year. Based on this recertification, communities who are adding additional credited activities can advance to a higher ranking. On the other hand, communities who are not properly or fully implementing credited activities may downgrade to a lesser ranking. Yet, regardless of a community's ranking, the benefits of participating in the CRS can be enticing for communities who are exceedingly vulnerable to flood disasters. One benefit of participation is the reduction in flood insurance premiums for private property owners located in SFHAs. (18) However, participation can also yield benefits that are not as easily captured in monetary terms. (14) The continued implementation of robust flood protection measures, for example, that can reduce the extent of damage to property and infrastructure, as well as minimize economic disruptions and reduce human suffering is arguably the most significant long-term benefit of participating in the CRS. Other benefits of participation that accrue more broadly include reduced flood risks, better information about flood risks, and better infrastructure for managing floods and responding to flood events. Participation may also result in stricter building codes and new land use rules. While some of these benefits are concentrated to SFHA communities, others are more proportional to local flood risks, and some are more diffused to the broader area.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Flood Hazards and Income
There is a robust literature on learning and adapting to flood hazards, although these either do not focus on income (21, 22) or do not observe a significant explanatory role for income. (23) The related literature on the demand for flood insurance has found a positive effect on income on the likelihood of insuring. (24, 25) A sizeable literature examines the property price variation associated with flood risk, flood information and experiences, and insurance policies. (26) (27) (28) As is common for property price hedonic studies, however, income is rarely explicitly considered.
The mixed evidence of price differentials related to flood risk can partly be explained by different property types, (29) suggesting that information and incentives may differ substantially across income classes.
The connection between income and willingness to reduce flood risk exposure has been studied in several ways. Sekulova and van den Bergh (30) use survey data to find persistent negative effects of flooding on life satisfaction, effects that are irrespective of individuals'
income. At a macro-level, Grames et al. (31) offer insights into how persistent flood risk can support multiple equilibria that sustain either a rich economy that invests in flood protection or a poor economy that consumes more and accumulates less capital to wash away. Daniel et al. (32) estimate a willingness-to-pay for risk reduction and observe that it is somewhat lower where income is greater. A common feature in this literature is that flood risk exposure is frequently correlated with other amenities, like recreational access, and demand for those amenities also generally depends on income. (33) Cordes and Yezer (34) show how rising income has increased development in risky coastal areas. Combining that finding with policies that subsidize rather than reduce risk suggests that wealthier homeowners may be disproportionately benefiting from those subsidies.
Community-Scale Flood Management, Flood Mitigation, and Income
Income has been positively linked with individuals' propensity to mitigate. (35, 36) The role of income on collective, rather than private, flood mitigation activities, however, may be quite different. For instance, wealthier residents may free-ride more on collective flood mitigation efforts. (37) Nonetheless, community wealth may affect capacity to undertake public infrastructure investments (e.g., Sadiq and Noonan (8) ) or access to national relief programs. Wealthier counties tend to attract more ex-ante FEMA disaster mitigation spending (e.g., mitigation planning, structural projects) as well as ex-post disaster relief. (38) The effects of mitigation and relief, in turn, on changes in wealth and poverty remain less well identified. Bagstad et al. (39) examine a set of policies, including some that promote local flood mitigation and management, and assess their distributional effects and influence on income inequality in the U.S. Gulf Coast. Their concern with perverse subsidies includes a concern that policies subsidizing floodplain development can increase transfers to the powerful and wealthy, although some mitigation programs (such as those in the CRS) can have positive effects by reducing taxpayer burdens for flood relief.
CRS Literature: What is Missing?
Researchers have studied various aspects of the CRS, focusing largely on the determinants of community participation, (2, 20) adaptive capacity, (40) policy learning, (6) the nonlinear incentive structure of the CRS, (8) the effects of the CRS on flood insurance demand, (10, 19) and flood insurance claims. (41) Most recently, Fan and Davlasheridze (7) examined heterogeneity in demand for CRS activities by demographic groups, confirming differential responses to flood mitigation efforts. Although these and other CRS-based studies may provide valuable information about the consequences of the CRS on communities, there is a need to investigate the unintended consequences of the CRS such as concerns over the fairness of the CRS (e.g., the scoring and allocation of discounted flood insurance premiums). (10) It is important to note that while researchers have examined the income distributional effects of the NFIP, (11, 42) the impacts of the CRS on poverty and income inequality is yet to be studied.
Determinants of Poverty
The problem of poverty remains a major challenge for researchers and policymakers (43) despite the myriad studies conducted to understand the antecedents of poverty. (42) (43) (44) (45) Rather than review all the extensive work on the antecedents of poverty at the community level, we review the literature on the relationship between poverty and the control variables relevant to this analysis: housing value, vacancy rates, population density, non-migrants, unemployment, renters, and property damage.
Housing Value
A majority of the studies examining the relationship between housing values and poverty have done so with a racial minority focus. Pandey and Coulton, (46) for example, explored racial changes in neighborhoods in Cleveland, Ohio to assess the factors influencing neighborhoods' poverty rates and social conditions. Upon analyzing 185 census tracts in Cleveland, the findings revealed a negative relationship between geographic concentrations of poverty and housing values. This negative relationship is conceivable because foreclosures, bankruptcies, and equity losses can lead to lower housing values, thus attracting poor people due to affordability.
Vacancy Rates
The proportion of vacant homes in a community can have adverse effects on its economy, and subsequently, on its level of poverty. (47) The presence of a high percentage of vacant homes in a community may be an indication of a lack of economic opportunity in that community, which can exacerbate its poverty level. (44) Furthermore, vacant homes can reduce property values, and lead to lower rent, which would ultimately increase the number of poor people moving into such neighborhoods.
Population Density
Impoverished areas tend to be concentrated to specific counties, neighborhoods, and regions.
(48) Historically, rural areas have observed higher poverty rates compared to urban areas.
(48) Hirschl and Rank (26) explored the effect of population density on welfare participation in rural and urban counties in the United States. The findings revealed that despite the fact that rural counties have higher poverty rates, they are less likely to participate in welfare programs.
However, in assessing urban poverty, Cohen (50) suggests that despite a high and persistent poverty rate, individuals living in densely populated areas typically have better access to public services to include education, healthcare, water, and electricity. In sum, population density may influence poverty rates; however the relationship may be nonlinear.
Non-migrants
A limited number of studies have explored the relationship between the proportion of a migrating population and poverty rates. Rupasingha and Goetz (43) found a positive and statistically significant relationship between non-migrants (i.e., percent of population that did not move within last five years) and poverty rates among a sample of 3,047 counties in the United
States. In short, the frequency with which residents migrate in a community is closely related to poverty rates, given the importance of location and development decisions in flood management, particularly important in this analysis.
Unemployment
The literature on the relationship between poverty and unemployment rate (the percentage of the work force that is currently not working) (51) has generally been positive.
Blank, (52) 
Renters
Scholars have consistently found that renters are more likely to experience poverty than homeowners. Caner and Wolff, (54) for instance, explored assets-based poverty in the United
States and found that the assets-based poverty rate for homeowners was approximately 27%
while the assets-based poverty rate for renters was nearly 67%. Haveman and Wolff (55) found similar results in their study of assets-based poverty in the United States. The findings revealed that assets-based poverty for renters increased from 52% in 1983 to 64% in 2001 and assetsbased poverty for homeowners only increased from 4% in 1983 to 6% in 2001. Instead of exploring assets-based poverty, Kutty (56) explored housing-induced poverty, which refers to a situation where a household cannot afford basic necessities (e.g., food and clothing) after paying for their housing. Using data provided from the 1999 American Housing Survey, Kutty (56) found that nearly 50% of renters were not officially in poverty, but were experiencing housing-induced poverty.
Flood-related Property Damage
The literature on the relationship between property damage from natural disasters and poverty has been studied on a national and international scale. Nationally, Yoon (57) assessed the relationship between social vulnerability and disaster damages among counties along the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic coast. The findings revealed that counties with higher social vulnerability in regards to poverty, unemployment, education, occupation, and resource availability experienced greater property damages from natural disasters. In fact, poverty was found to be the most powerful predictor of property damage. (57) Internationally, Brouwer et al. (58) surveyed nearly 700 floodplain residents in Bangladesh to explore the relationship between risk, poverty, and vulnerability. The authors posited that floodplain residents living below the poverty threshold will suffer more from being exposed to environmental hazards compared to those living above the poverty threshold. Upon analyzing average flood damage as a share of household income, the findings revealed that those living below the poverty threshold experienced greater disaster damages. Similarly, Kahn (59) found that poorer individuals face greater exposure to and damage from natural disasters as they are more likely to live in hazardous areas.
METHODOLOGY
We analyze the effects of CRS participation on neighborhood-level dynamics, focusing in particular on local income distribution and poverty rates. Our primary attention is on measuring the impact of the CRS on the lower end of the income distribution, operationalized here as the poverty rate. The empirical analysis also examines the rest of the income distribution such as median income levels, the share of the population in the top percentile of income, and a GINI coefficient to characterize the variation in local income.
The 
Data
In order to assess the impact of the CRS and flood risk on poverty and income inequality, we merged five different data sources together (see Table III Index value/minimum, maximum, mean by tract, etc.
1 1 The USDOT flood risk data are converted from a 1km by 1km grid cell map onto census block groups, taking the mean value of the flood risk metric across the cells in each block group. Then, each census tract takes the mean value of these block groups' flood risk value. This mean-mean aggregation function was just one of many alternatives tried (e.g., min-max, max-max, max-mean). While the results vary somewhat, the basic findings are not very sensitive to the aggregation choice. The mean-mean approach is used here as it is the most straightforward. Other constructions are available upon request.
The fourth data source is the most current Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS). FIRMS contain information about SFHAs and the risk premium zones for 87% of the United States. This information is available from FEMA at the tract level. The fifth data source is flood risk data from the United States Department of Transportation (US DOT) (1996) . The information contained in the flood risk data is of very high resolution (1 km grid cell), and based on a ranking of flood risk (on a 0-100 scale). 
Dependent Variable
The analysis considers four distinct dependent variables in separate models (see Table   IV ), but with the same basic model specification. 
Independent Variables
We are interested in three independent variables: CRS participation, flood risk of tracts in 
Control Variables
We control for the following variables: property damage, poverty rate, mean housing value, population density, county non-migrants, unemployment rate, renters, and vacant homes.
Property damage is measured as the total flood damage over the previous 5 years, per capita, adjusted to 2013 dollars. Poverty rate is measured as the 10-year lag of the tract poverty rate.
Mean housing value is measured as the log of mean housing value for the community (10-year lag), while population density is measured as the total tract population divided by the total tract land area (10-year lag). We measured county non-migrants as the proportion of persons residing in the same county five years ago (10-year lag). Further, unemployment rate is measured as the number of unemployed divided by the total number of people in the labor force (10-year lag).
Renters is the share of total housing units that are rentals (10-year lag). Finally, Vacancy is measured as the share of total housing units that are vacant (10-year lag).
Posey's (40) study suggests a potential simultaneity between poverty rate and CRS. Using data from the US Census to measure municipalities' socioeconomic status, and participation in the CRS as a proxy for adaptive capacity, Posey (40) found a negative and statistically significant relationship between poverty rates and CRS participation in both a national dataset and one of New Jersey's coastal communities. While Posey (40) used poverty rate as an independent variable, we use it as a dependent variable. We address this reverse causality issue by using fixed effects is approximately 41 (on a scale of 0-100), and about 12% of tract areas are in SFHAs. In addition, county non-migrants constitute about 59% of the sample, and the average unemployment rate is 5.6%. Finally, 31.1% and 7.9% of the sample are renters and vacant housing units, respectively. Table VI is not significantly related to changes in the income distribution at the median or at the lower tail, although it does appear to discourage top earners from living there. This effect brings more income equality to the neighborhood, relative to other tracts in the U.S.
RESULTS
The incentives in the CRS program design can account for these interaction effects quite easily. As the discounted insurance premiums have greatest effects as CRS*SFHA grows, and may disproportionately affect wealthy property owners, (61) it is not surprising that CRS floodplains are attracting more wealth. In fact, some flood-prone areas have experienced gentrification. For example, a significant level of gentrification has been observed in New
Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. (62) Furthermore, other flood management practices may also lead to poorer residents relocating elsewhere in the community (e.g., tighter building codes raising housing costs). Another mechanism by which poorer residents are moving out of the floodplains could be through the implementation of acquisition and relocation (e.g., relocating mobile home parks), which is a CRS activity engaged in by 24% of participating communities (see Table II ).
The findings here complement the relatively thin literature on the effects of communityscale flood management programs on income distributions. Notably, Bagstad et al.'s (2007) concerns about perverse subsidies leading to unjust income distributions may not apply to the CRS. Rather, their recommended programs (e.g., tighter building standards, relocation assistance, and wetland conservation) are all activities that the CRS can reward. The resulting negative effects (in floodplains) of CRS participation on local Gini coefficients and poverty rates points to some favorable results for income inequality consistent with Bagstad et al. (39) That CRS participation also attracts high-income households to floodplains areas is also consistent with prior evidence of income-driven new development in flood-prone areas. (34) Further, the CRSdiscounted insurance premiums are attractive to those purchasing insurance, who tend to be wealthier (24) , and the wealthier households have greater capacity and propensity to mitigate (e.g., Osbergerhaus (35) ).
Similarly, the effect of CRS*Risk on the wealthiest CRS residents, who shy away from residing in high flood risk areas suggest that the deterrent effect of CRS flood management effort is working in at least one segment of the income distribution. Wealthier residents are apparently responsive to the incentives: take a discount to live in the safer parts of floodplains, but eschew high-risk areas, especially if they do not come with discounted premiums. Poorer residents are kept out of floodplains, likely receiving more of the "scarecrow" effects of CRS activities (and not as much positive incentive) as they disperse elsewhere in the community.
If the CRS is attracting poverty rather than creating it, then there may be some solace taken here. Communities most actively managing their flood risks are also disproportionately drawing people in poverty to live there. This may bode well for the "next Hurricane Katrina,"
and it might reflect the greater capacity of wealthier residents to essentially self-insure against flood risks outside of CRS communities. The notion that CRS communities may be pushing these new poor residents outside of floodplains is particularly heartening for those concerned about protecting vulnerable populations from natural hazard risks. In a sense, the "system" is working for the poor, and the wealthiest residents may be finding ways to "game the system" by seeking discounts and lower risks. CRS communities may be having more and faster success at relocating poor residents away from flood risk than they have for wealthy residents.
The results have implications beyond just the communities participating in the CRS.
Insofar as CRS-discounted insurance premiums are consistent with risk-based premiums, the results here build on Hudson et al.'s (63) findings that risk-based insurance premiums could promote adaptation to flood risk but conflict with affordability. Thus, the CRS may be incentivizing more individual policyholder adaptation while non-CRS communities' higher premiums present an affordability problem where low-income individuals do not insure. The results here suggest that floodplain areas enjoying CRS-discounted premiums also house fewer poor residents, which shifts the affordability challenge to flood-prone areas outside the CRS. A temporary voucher plan for low-income households (64) could address this unaffordability concern.
The results here point to several ways to improve the effectiveness of flood risk management efforts in the U.S. The evidence that residents respond to flood risk differently than (SFHA) floodplain designations reinforces the value of risk-weighted insurance premiums and other more graduated flood management activities. A binary approach that treats things inside floodplains equally and mostly ignores things outside official floodplains leaves room for improvement, and at least the wealthy residents discern the difference and strategically react.
Furthermore, even seemingly income-neutral flood risk management can, and does, have differential effects across the income distribution. Policymakers may seek to explicitly address or reward efforts that target key parts of the income distribution. For instance, the information and incentives provided in communities that join the CRS appear to only discourage the wealthy from residing in high-risk areas; the poor do not respond to those incentives (perhaps, because they do not get the message or get the message, but do not have the resources to relocate from high-risk areas). A more effective flood-risk management program could make sure that the information and incentives are accessible and actionable across the income distribution. Finally, that joining the CRS is followed by fewer poor and more very wealthy residents in SFHAs may be seen as a partial success, but does raise concerns about greater exposure of high-value property to flood risks-an unintended consequence of the CRS that is worth managing carefully.
CONCLUSION
In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of the CRS on participating local communities, there is a need to examine both its intended and unintended consequences. While the former has been the subject of previous research, (2, 8) the latter has yet to be explored despite evidence suggesting that the CRS may have differential impacts on communities. (10) To address this research gap, the current study explores how the CRS-a program designed to mitigate flood disasters-impacts poverty and income inequality in participating CRS communities. The analysis raises and answers some questions about the impacts of flood mitigation activities on and across the income distribution. This is especially important not just as we assess the fairness of public investments in flood risk management, but also because vulnerability to those risks is closely tied to income and household resources.
Our study is the first to provide empirical evidence on the impacts of the CRS on poverty and income inequality. Specifically, the results indicate that median incomes are lower in a CRS participating community, but rise in floodplains. Additionally, the results suggest that the CRS may be attracting poor people, perhaps as a result of a community's investments in flood management measures as part of the requirements for participating in the CRS. However, once poor residents move in, the CRS program seems to be relocating them away from areas that are highly prone to flooding. With regard to income inequality, the CRS is attracting top earners (perhaps due to the availability of flood insurance premium reductions), including CRS areas that are vulnerable to flooding. Finally, the CRS is encouraging income inequality, but discouraging income inequality in areas that are highly susceptible to flooding.
To fully assess the consequences-both intended and unintended-of the CRS, policy makers, planners, emergency managers, and those in charge of evaluating the CRS should find our results insightful. Our study suggests that the CRS has unintended impacts on poverty and income inequality and that these unexpected consequences should be taken into account when evaluating the CRS program. By including information on the unintended impacts of the CRS on poverty and income inequality, CRS evaluators and other stakeholders would be able to have a holistic understanding of the benefits and costs associated with the CRS. The use of nationallevel data allows the results to be more generalizable. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this study did not control for other variables such as prior flood experience and political affiliation.
Despite this limitation, our study lays the foundation for future work on the unintended consequences of the CRS on participating communities. A good understanding of the unexpected consequences of the CRS on poverty and income inequality can help policymakers improve the overall performance of the CRS, and in particular, its flood risk management piece. Nonetheless, further inquiries are urgently warranted. First, it is important for researchers to examine whether the CRS, as currently implemented, will be able to reduce flood-related impacts on communities in the future amid the growing challenges engendered by climate change. Second, an examination of the CRS's impacts on issues such as migration, housing development, housing prices, and building codes merits further investigation. And the distribution of those impacts over different subpopulations and income levels, again, deserves special attention. Third, the relationship between CRS participation and the type of government deserves attention. For instance, does CRS participation depend on whether a local community is governed by a mayor or city council? Finally, amid a low CRS participation rate by communities, there is a need to study the factors that motivate local communities to participate in the CRS and other voluntary federal government risk mitigation programs. This study is a crucial step in helping the risk analysis community to better understand the relationship between risk and poverty as well as the role of risk analysis in the quest to alleviate poverty and reduce income inequality.
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